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 Reviewed by: Ethan Kelly, Jr.
 Date: 5/16/95

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INFO OCT-01 ANG-PA 1001 =

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5431

S F R R F T SECTION 01 OF 09 SECTO 24258

UNCLAS E.O. 12958: R75-3 6/19/01 (SETT7, R.G. M.)
TACS: NVP (MAIG, ALEXANDER M.), CM
SENJECTY SECRETARY MAIG'S JUNE 14, 1981 RYALEAL WITH MIANG, HIA

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY : SECRETARY HAIG'S FIRSTMAJ-53RAL WITH CHINESE VICE PREMIER/FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA WAS DEVOTED TO AN EXPLANATION OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO GLOBAL STRATEGY. THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED THIS POLICY AS BASED ON FOUR "PILLARS": (1) THE RECOGNITION OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE GLOBAL DOMINATION AS THE PRINCIPAL THREAT TO WORLD PEACE; (2) REJUVENATION OF THE TRADITIONAL ALLIANCES AND FRIENDSHIPS OF THE US TO COUNTER THE SOVIET THREAT; (3) US EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH JUST AND RESPONSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD; (4) REINVIGORATION OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY.

3. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF SINO-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN THESE ENDS. HE NOTED SOVIET RISINGS AT THE WEAKENING OF US MILITARY POWER, SOVIET EFFORTS TO DIVIDE COUNTRIES OPPOSED TO THEM, AND THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AS THE MAJOR CHALLENGE WE FACE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM HUIANG, THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED SOVIET EFFORTS TO NEUTRALIZE WESTERN EUROPE. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID THE MAJOR FOCUS WAS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, WHERE THEY SOUGHT CONTROL OF

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KEY STRATEGIC CHOKE POINTS AND RESOURCES, & PRINCIPAL
SOVIET PREOCCUPATION IN THIS REGION WAS SOUTHWEST ASIA.

4. THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED THE US DEFENSE OUTLOOK
IN DETAIL. HUANG

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5. HUANG

THE SECRETARY
DESCRIBED HIS SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS DURING HIS SINGLE
FAST VISIT AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT. HE OUTLINED HIS
EFFORTS TO ELICIT NORTH AFRICAN COOPERATION FOR GENUINE
INDEPENDENCE AND NONALIGNMENT FOR AFRICA.

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6. THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG AGREED ON
THE DANGEROUS NATURE OF RECENT CHANGES IN SOVIET
POLICIES TOWARD POLAND, AND ON THE NEED FOR A FIRM AND
UNITED INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE. DETAILED DISCUSSION
OF AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA WAS DEFERRED TO THEIR SECOND
MEETING.

7. PARTICIPATING IN THIS MEETING FOR THE US WERE THE
SECRETARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
GALL, BOY, GENERAL WALTERS, DE DIRECTOR RUST, WERSOS,
ARMAROST, MILLEY, ARMITAGE, GOLDBERG AND FREEMAN
INTERPRETER, AND MR. CHANG, INTERPRETER. FOR THE
CHINESE SIDE, VICE PREMIER HUANG, VICE MINISTER ZHANG,
AMBASSADOR CHAI, DIRECTOR HAN YU, WERSOS, LI CHAOZHU,
TANG LONGSHAN, ZHANG XEPIN, AND YANG (INTERPRETER), AND
SIX NOTE-TAKERS, AND SUMMARY.

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FM USCFE SECRETARY IN BEIJING
TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5432

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8. HUANG HUA WELCOMED THE SECRETARY AND HIS PARTY TO
THE YINJIANG ROOM AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE AT
4:30 P.M. JUNE 14, 1951.

9. HUANG OPENED THE MEETING BY WARMLY WELCOMING THE
SECRETARY AND HIS PARTY ON BEHALF OF THE CHINESE GOVERN-
MENT. HE THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR HAVING ACCEPTED
CHINA'S INVITATION TO VISIT BEIJING. HUANG NOTED THAT
THE SECRETARY HAD LAST VISITED BEIJING 9-1/2 YEARS
AGO. HE HAD BECOME ACQUAINTED WITH THE LATE DECEASED
THOU ENLAI. THE CHINESE CONSIDERED THE SECRETARY AN
OLD FRIEND. HUANG NOTED HE WAS VISITING CHINA IN A
PERIOD OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND TURBULENCE. THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED HIS VISIT OF MAJOR
SIGNIFICANCE AND VERY USEFUL. ALTHOUGH THE VISIT WAS
SHORT, HUANG SAID, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HOPED IT
WOULD BE FRUITFUL.

10. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT HE ENJOYED RETURNING
TO BEIJING, WHICH WAS A PLACE FOR WHICH HE HAD GREAT
RESPECT AND AFFECTION. HE NOTED THE PRESENCE OF MANY
OLD FRIENDS ACROSS THE TABLE, ADDING THAT THIS RETURN
TO BEIJING HAD BEEN TOO LONG DELAYED. THE SECRETARY
SAID THAT THE CHINESE WERE AWARE THAT ON THE U.S.
SIDE OF THE TABLE WERE MANY MEN WHO HAD WORKED FOR

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PERSONAL CRYPTIC RELATIONS OVER A PERIOD OF AS MUCH AS 14 YEARS. THE SIGNIFICANCE WE ATTACH TO THIS VISIT COULD BE SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT OUR INTERPRETER HAD BEEN HUNTED ONLY THREE DAYS BEFORE THE TRIP.

11. HUANG HUA AND HIS COLLEAGUES CONGRATULATED MR. PHANG ON HER WEDDING.

12. THE SECRETARY THEN LAUGHED WHEN HE SAID THAT HE
 HOPED THAT MR. CHANG WOULD ENJOY HER VISIT TO
 BEIJING AS MUCH AS SHE MIGHT HAVE ENJOYED HER HONEY-
 MOON. THE SECRETARY THEN INTRODUCED THE MEMBERS
 OF HIS PARTY, NOTING IN EACH CASE THE ROLE THEY HAD
 PLAYED OR WOULD PLAY IN THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT
 OF GOOD US-CHINA RELATIONS. HE CONCLUDED HIS
 PRESENTATION BY EXPRESSING HIS PLEASURE AT THE
 NOMINATION OF AMBASSADOR HUMMEL AS US AMBASSADOR IN
 CHINA. HE SAID THAT AMBASSADOR HUMMEL HAD SERVED
 COMMAGOUSLY IN PAKISTAN DURING A PERIOD WHEN U.S.
 POLICIES WERE SOMETIMES CONSIDERED AND LESS THAN
 EFFECTIVE. IN THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD AMBASSADOR
 HUMMEL WAS ALWAYS A VOICE FOR TRUTH AND COURAGE.
 THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT HIS CONFIRMA-
 TION COULD BE CONCLUDED BY LATE JULY AND THAT HE
 MIGHT BE IN BEIJING BY THE END OF JULY OR EARLY
 AUGUST. DEFERRING AGAIN TO HIS PARTY,
 THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT HIS COMMENTS, WHICH HAD
 DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE PRESENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL,
 AS WELL AS THE STATE DEPARTMENT, DEMONSTRATED AN
 AMERICAN CONSENSUS ON THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF
 FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. - CHINA RELATIONS. THIS
 WAS COOPERATIVE NOT ONLY AS GOOD NEIGHBORHOODNESS BUT
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FM UNCL SECRETARY IN RETJNG
TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5433

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NOTE

15. THE SECRETARY BEGAN HIS PRESENTATION BY NOTING THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES IS THAT BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE LONG OVERDUE DISMISSAL OF THE POST-VIETNAM, POST-WATERGATE SYNDROME, WHICH HAD DOMINATED U.S. POLICY THROUGH THE FORD AND CARTER ADMINISTRATIONS. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD BEEN ELECTED ON A PLATFORM DEDICATED TO THE REINVIGORATION OF AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AROUND THE WORLD. THIS REINVIGORATION RESTED ON FOUR BASIC "PILLARS."

16. THE FIRST "PILLAR" WAS STRUCTURED ON THE CONVICTION OF THE PRESIDENT -- HELD STRONGLY IN EARLIER TIMES AND HELD BY HIM STRONGLY TODAY -- THAT THE GREATEST THREATS TO WORLD PEACE ARE THE SEARCH FOR HEGEMONY BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GROWING DANGER ARISING FROM THE SOVIET'S IMMENSE ACCUMULATION OF MILITARY POWER. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION INTENDED TO INSIST ON INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND ON RECIPROCITY IN OUR OWN DEALINGS WITH SOVIETS. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, WE WOULD REQUIRE MAJOR STRENGTHENING OF AMERICAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES, WHICH THE SECRETARY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS, HE SAID, IN A FEW MOMENTS.

17. THE SECOND "PILLAR" OF PRESIDENT
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A VITAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES.

13. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WAS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS DISPUAL. PERHAPS IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO OUTLINE THE NEW APPROACHES TO FOREIGN POLICY THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD INITIATED. AFTER A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE GLOBE HE COULD TURN TO SPECIFIC REGIONS, WORKING TOGETHER TO AVOID HIS HAVING TO DELIVER A MONOLOGUE.

14. HUANG ENDORSED THIS ARRANGEMENT. HE SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE A BRIEFING ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FOREIGN POLICY, PARTICULARLY AN EXPLANATION OF HOW THE U.S. VIEWED THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION FROM A STRATEGIC STANDPOINT AND HOW U.S. - CHINA RELATIONS MIGHT FIT INTO U.S. STRATEGY. HE PROMISED TO ASK QUESTIONS AND MAKE COMMENTS AND NOT LET THE SECRETARY ENGAGE IN A MONOLOGUE. HUANG THEN INTRODUCED HIS OWN PARTY TO THE SECRETARY.

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DEAGAN'S POLICY WAS THE REINFORCEMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF BOTH OUR TRADITIONAL ALLIANCES AND OUR RELATIONS WITH FRIENDLY NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES CONCERNED WITH THE THREAT OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM.

18. THE THIRD "PILLAR" WAS, THE SECRETARY SAID, THE RECOGNITION THAT IN A CHANGING WORLD IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE U.S. ESTABLISH JUST AND RESPONSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD. WE SEEK TO FOSTER A CLEAR RECOGNITION ON THE PART OF MORE AND MORE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THAT ASSOCIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION LEADS ONLY TO DISAPPOINTMENT. IT BRINGS ARGUMENTS, BUT NOT GROWTH, NOT ECONOMIC BENEFITS, OR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL OR MEDICAL PROGRESS. THE DEAGAN ADMINISTRATION BELIEVED THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PURSUE POLICIES TO COUNTER THE SPECTRE OF IMPERIALISM AND HEGEMONISM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD THAT THE SOVIETS HAD RAISED. OUR POLICY WOULD BE BASED ON THE RECOGNITION THAT "TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT" WAS AN IMPORTANT TERM, AND THAT WE MUST DEAL WITH TRULY NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES IN A SENSITIVE AND ENLIGHTENED WAY. THE SECRETARY NOTED, HOWEVER, THE DIFFICULTY OF "TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT," QUOTING PRESIDENT YIA OF PAKISTAN AS HAVING SAID THAT THERE ARE "ONLY TWO TRULY NON-ALIGNED NATIONS IN THE WORLD," THE U.S. AND THE USSR.

19. FINALLY, THE FOURTH "PILLAR" OF OUR POLICY, THE SECRETARY SAID, WAS THE RECOGNITION THAT WE CANNOT REINFORCE OUR POLICIES AND RELATIONSHIPS ABOARD WITHOUT STRENGTHENING OUT OUR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES.

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20 IN APPROACHING THE QUESTION OF CHINA'S ROLE IN THIS REGARD, THE SECRETARY SAID, HE WOULD PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL BELIEF OF THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADMINISTRATION THAT THE US-CHINA DEEDMARCHMENT OF THE 1970'S WAS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC EVENT OF THAT DECADE. AS GREAT AS ITS SIGNIFICANCE AND BEEN IN THE 1970'S, HOWEVER, IN THE 1980'S -- AN INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS DECADE -- STRONG U.S. CHINA RELATIONS TOOK ON EVEN GREATER SIGNIFICANCE. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVED THAT ONLY THROUGH MORE EFFECTIVE COOPERATING AND COORDINATION OF POLICIES BETWEEN BEIJING AND WASHINGTON COULD WE HOPE TO COPE WITH THE INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS GLOBAL STRATEGY OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH SEEKS WORLDWIDE DOMINATION.

21. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT WHEN HE HAD HAD SEVERAL DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, MR. GORBATOV, HE HAD DRAWN THREE IMPORTANT CONCLUSIONS. FIRST, THE SOVIET UNION TODAY IS MOST DISTURBED BY THE PROSPECT THAT THE UNITED STATES AT

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ACTION 4005-28

INFO OCT-01 405-02 1401 -

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FM USSR SECRETARY IN BEIJING
TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5834

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UNCLAS

LONG LAST IS DEDICATED TO DEBTLING IN MILITARY
STRENGTH. SOVIET POLICIES WILL THEREFORE SEEK TO
REVERSE THIS NEW AMERICAN RESOLVE. TO ACHIEVE THIS
OBJECTIVE, THEY WILL USE A VARIETY OF MEANS -- IN-
CLUDING ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES AND PEACE OFFENSIVES --
DESIGNED TO BREAK UP THE UNUSUAL HISTORICAL CONSENSUS
WHICH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, THE CONGRESS, AND THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH HAD ACHIEVED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN
20 YEARS. THE UNANIMOUS AMERICAN VIEW WAS THAT IT
WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE UNITED STATES TO DEBTL ITS
MILITARY STRENGTH.

22. THE SECOND CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION
INTENDED TO DO EVERYTHING IT COULD TO BREAK
UP ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THOSE WHO WOULD
COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. AGAINST SOVIET IMPERIALISM.
IN SHORT THEY INTENDED TO POSE AS ADVOCATES OF
PEACE AND DISARMAMENT; ELSEWHERE THEY WOULD PURSUE
ANY TACTIC THEY COULD. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT
TASS HAD, ON THE VERY DAY OF HIS ARRIVAL IN BEIJING
ATTACKED HIS VISIT TO CHINA IN WHAT HE SARCASTICALLY
TERMED "VERY SUBTLE TERMS."

23. A THIRD CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE SOVIETS
RECOGNIZED THE FUNDAMENTAL FAILURE OF THEIR

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SYSTEM OF MARXISM/LENINISM AND THE SOVIET MODEL. IN AGRICULTURE AND THE ECONOMY, IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, IN THE AREA OF DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS AMONG THE NON-BOULSTON POPULATION AND CENTRIFUGAL PRESSURES IN THE SOVIET EMPIRE, SUCH AS THOSE WE SEE IN POLAND, SOVIET LEADERS HAVE COME TO SEE THEMSELVES AS OPERATING UNDER A DEADLINE. IN OUR VIEW THESE CHANGES MADE THE SOVIETS MORE, NOT LESS, DANGEROUS. POSSESSED AT PRESENT WITH UNPRECEDENTED MILITARY STRENGTH, THEY WOULD BE TEMPTED TO TAKE RISKS AHEAD IN ORDER TO DIVERT INTERNAL ATTENTION FROM THEIR FAILURES.

24. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THEN DEAGAN ADMITS- TRAITOR HAD CONCLUDED THAT FOR THESE REASONS THE CON- SEQUENCE OF CHINESE AND AMERICAN POLICIES IN THE STRATEGIC SENSE HAD TAKEN ON UNUSUAL IMPORTANCE IN THE PENTAGON AHEAD.

25. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT U.S. PLANS TO STRENGTHEN OUR MILITARY DEFENSES IF THE FOREIGN MINISTER WISHED.

26. HUANG SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW REMARKS.

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FM USUFL SECRETARY IN BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5439

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29. THE SECRETARY SAID, FIRST OF ALL, WITH
RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE USSR HAD A
GLOBAL STRATEGY, THE EXPERIENCE OF THE POST-WWII
PERIOD CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE IN SEARCH OF
GLOBAL HEGEMONY. THIS SEARCH HAD IDEOLOGICAL OVER-
TONES, BUT IN PRACTICE THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO
USE THEIR INFLUENCE AND TO SEEK ANY TARGET OF OPPOR-
TUNITY TO EXPAND THEIR PRESENCE IN THE WORLD. HE
HAD SEEN THIS IN A HOST OF INSTANCES. IN EUROPE
THE SOVIETS SEEK TO NEUTRALIZE OR FINLANDIZE THE
COUNTRIES OF THE AREA. IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD THE
SOVIETS ACTED THROUGH PROXIES AND ATTEMPTED TO EST-
ABLISH CLIENT-STATE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THIRD WORLD
COUNTRIES. THEY FOUND MANY WHO WERE WILLING TO
TAKE WEAPONS FROM THEM. IN THE WORLD AT LARGE THE
SOVIETS ATTEMPTED TO SPLIT ALL WHO MIGHT ATTEMPT TO
STAND TOGETHER AGAINST THEM. THE RUSSIAN
STRATEGY, THEREFORE, WAS TO FRAGMENT AND NEUTRALIZE
WESTERN EUROPE, AND PROOF ITS DEFENSE CAPABILITIES,
BUT THEY SAW THEIR GREATEST OPPORTUNITY PERHAPS IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD. THEY PURSUED THIS INTEREST NOT ONLY
IN TERMS OF EXPANDED INFLUENCE BUT ALSO THROUGH
EFFORTS TO SEIZE KEY STRATEGIC CHOKE POINTS FROM
WHICH THEY COULD CONTROL COMMERCE, ENERGY SUPPLIES OR
THE FLOW OF RAW MATERIALS. IN THIS WAY THEY HOPED

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THEY COULD STRANGLE THE WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES WITHOUT HAVING TO OPENLY FIGHT THEM.

30. THEIR KEY STRATEGY -- WHICH THEY HAD USED WITH SOME SUCCESS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD -- WAS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF LOCAL INJUSTICE AND THROTTLE THROUGH SUBVERSION, TERRORISM, AND INFILTRATION. THEY SOUGHT IN THIS WAY TO CREATE A CORRELATION OF FORCES WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY SOVIET INTERVENTION EITHER BY THE SUPPLY OF WEAPONS, BY THE INTRODUCTION OF PROXY FORCES OR EVEN AS IN AFGHANISTAN -- BY THE DIRECT USE OF SOVIET FORCES THEMSELVES. HE HAD SEEN THIS PATTERN, THE SECRETARY SAID, IN ANGOLA, IN ETHIOPIA, IN SOUTH YEMEN, IN NORTH YEMEN, IN AFGHANISTAN, CAMBODIA, AND EL SALVADOR. IN EL SALVADOR, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS HOPED TO REACH INTO HONDURAS AND GUATEMALA -- OR EVEN PANAMA OR MEXICO IF THEIR ACTIVITIES WERE LEFT UNATTENDED.

31. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT AMONG THE MOST URGENT TASKS HE FACE WHICH HE HAD NOT PERFORMED WELL AT ALL TIMES IN THE PAST WAS TO DEAL WITH DEVELOPING STATES IN A WAY THAT HELPED THEM RECOGNIZE THE REALITIES OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE AND THE NEED TO MAINTAIN TRUE NEUTRALITY AND ASSOCIATION WITH THE WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED STATES, FROM WHICH THEY COULD ENJOY A MORE ORGANIC CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR DEVELOPMENT THAN COULD BE MADE BY THE SOVIETS. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THIS WAS THE APPROACH THE UNITED STATES WAS TAKING IN AFRICA, WHERE HE WERE THE HIGHEST AND CONTRIBUTOR TO ZAMBIA, AND A GENUINE CONTRIBUTOR TO THE RECENT AFRICAN PEACE CONFERENCE IN GENEVA. HE WERE WORKING TO ACHIEVE GENUINE INDEPENDENCE, INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND STABILITY FOR NAMIBIA UNDER TERMS WHICH WOULD NOT MAKE IT A SOVIET MARXIST/LENINIST

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PARITY. THIS WAS ALSO THE APPROACH IN CENTRAL
AMERICA. OUR EFFORTS THERE WERE NOT EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY BUT

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ACTION 4004-70

THRU OCT-21 403-20 /001 4

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FM USOPC SECRETARY IN BEIJING
TO SFCSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5434

SECRET SECTION 4 OF 9 SFC TO 44058

40014

WATKIN DEPENDS UPON THE ELABORATION OF A NEW REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PLAN COORDINATE WITH NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES
IN THE REGION AND BENEFITTING FROM CONTRIBUTIONS FROM
THE WEST EUROPEANS AND JAPANESE.

12. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTY
OF ACHIEVING THESE OBJECTIVES, GIVEN HISTORIC MISTAKES
NOT ONLY BY THE UNITED STATES BUT BY THE WESTERN
INDUSTRIAL POWERS AS A WHOLE. THESE OBJECTIVES MUST
BE PURSUED, HE SAID, WITH GREAT SINCERITY AND PERSEVER-
ENCE. HE MUST, HOWEVER, BE COGNIZANT THAT
OUR OBJECTIVES COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED EXCLUSIVELY BY
"NATION-BUILDING" APPROACHES. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THE
QUINCE OF UNREST AND TURMOIL IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
AND TAKE ACTIONS WHICH REACH DIRECTLY TO THE SOURCES OF
YCH TURMOIL. IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE WE WERE
CONCERNED ABOUT CUBA AS SUCH A SOURCE. IN NORTH AFRICA
WE WERE CONCERNED ABT LIBYA. BUT IN A GLOBAL SENSE
IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE MAJOR SOURCE OF SUCH DIFFICULTY
WAS THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF.

13. HUANG ASKED IF THE SECRETARY WOULD CARE TO DESCRIBE
HIS VIEW OF THE FOCUS OF SOVIET GLOBAL STRATEGY. THAT
IS, ON WHICH AREAS DID THE SOVIET UNION CONCENTRATE ITS
EFFORTS?

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14. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THERE WAS STRATEGIC PRESSURE BY THE SOVIETS ON MANY FRONTS. WHERE THEY HAVE ENCOUNTERED STRONG OPPOSITION THEY WOULD SHIFT TO WHERE THEY ENCOUNTERED SOFTNESS OR WHERE FORWARD PROGRESS WAS POSSIBLE. THEY SOUGHT TO NEUTRALIZE WESTERN EUROPE THROUGH PEACE OFFENSIVES AND BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE NATURAL APPETITE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN PEOPLE FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL. IN THE THIRD WORLD THEY ALSO ATTEMPTED TO MOVE ON A BROAD FRONT. THEY WERE CONCENTRATING ON ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION AND STRATEGIC CHOKE POINTS SO AS FAR AS THAT CONTAINED MAJOR ENERGY AND RAW MATERIAL SUPPLIES. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND CENTRAL AMERICA WERE IMPORTANT. THEY CLEARLY REGARDED IT AS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO CONTROL THE BELT LAYER CONNECTING THE INDIAN AND PACIFIC OCEANS. THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND OTHER LINES OF COMMUNICATION ACROSS THE WORLD. IT WAS IN THIS CONNECTION THAT HE HAD TO VIEW THEIR OUTLOOK IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM. THEY HAD CONSTRUCTED NEW INTELLIGENCE BASES THERE, SECOND IN SIZE ONLY TO THEIR FACILITY IN CHINA.

15. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR DUBOVNIK, THE SECRETARY NOTED, HE HAD PERCEIVED A RUSSIAN PREOCCUPATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, I.E., THE REGION FROM AFGHANISTAN THROUGH THAILAND TO THE PERSIAN GULF. THIS WAS CLEARLY A TARGET OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIETS. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT ONE MUST NEVER ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS MOVED INTO AFGHANISTAN ONLY TO ESTABLISH A SAFETY BUFFER. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEIR INVASION MUST BE VIEWED AS PREDICATED ON HEGEMONISTIC DECISIONS ON KEY ENERGY-PRODUCING AREAS OF THE WORLD.

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AND ON THE COMMUNICATIONS ROUTES THROUGH WHICH ENERGY IS TRANSPORTED. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT, IF IT WERE OF INTEREST TO THE CHINESE, OUR EXPERTS WOULD BE PREPARED TO HOLD SIDE TALKS WITH THE CHINESE MILITARY ON ASPECTS OF OUR OWN MILITARY PLANNING AND TO PROVIDE UPDATED ASSESSMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN THREAT. GENERAL WILSON MIGHT PROVIDE THE LATTER.

MR. RUBY AND HIS COLLEAGUES COULD DISCUSS THE FORMER. WILSON RESPONDED THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS COULD AND WOULD BE MADE.

36. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT DESPITE HIS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, WHICH HE SHARED WITH DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ALIKE, THIS YEAR HE WAS ADDING 32 BILLION DOLLARS TO THE ORIGINAL CARTER DEFENSE BUDGET. OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS HE WOULD ADD 200 BILLION DOLLARS OVER WHAT CARTER HAD PLANNED. THESE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES WOULD GO TO IMPROVING OUR CENTRAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POWER AND ALSO, MORE IMPORTANTLY OUR NAVAL AND GROUND FORCES.

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37. IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC AND NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, WE INTENDED TO PUT IN A NEW STRATEGIC BOMBER AND PUT IT INTO PRODUCTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE WOULD ADD 3,000 LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES AS WELL AS NEW LAND-BASED STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS. WE WERE DEVELOPING OUR NEWEST MISSILE-LAUNCHING SUBMARINE AND NAVIO MISSILE TO THE UK. WE INTENDED TO ENHANCE OUR THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES AS WELL.

38. IN THE AREA OF CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES, WE WERE BUILDING A NEW TANK AND ARMOR FIGHTING VEHICLES WHICH WE WOULD PRODUCE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. WE WOULD INTRODUCE A NEW ROCKET LAUNCHER AND ASSAULT HELICOPTER, AS WELL AS THREE NEW ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES. WE PLANNED TO STEP UP PRODUCTION FOR FIVE NEW FIGHTER-BOMBER TYPES. WE WERE WORKING TO IMPROVE PROPORTIONING OF WAR RESERVE MATERIAL TO ENHANCE OUR ABILITY TO DEACT QUICKLY, IF NECESSARY, IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MEDITERRANEAN.

39. PERHAPS OUR MOST SUBSTANTIAL BUILD-UP WOULD BE IN NAVAL POWER. WE WOULD ADD 150 SHIPS TO THE 450 NOW IN OUR INVENTORY, BRINGING THE NAVY TO 600 SHIPS. WE WOULD INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CARRIER TASK GROUPS FROM 12 TO 17, WHILE ADDING MANY CRUISE MISSILES TO OUR FLEET.

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INCLUDING THOSE ON TWO REFINISHED BATTLESHIP, ADDING
SIGNIFICANTLY TO OUR NAVY'S LONG RANGE AND FIRE SUPPORT
CAPABILITIES.

40. HUANG SAID

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42. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS NOT SURPRISED AT THE
EXAMPLES CITED BY THE VICE PREMIER, ADDING THAT HE WAS
ONLY SURPRISED THAT HE HAD NOT MENTIONED THE LIFTING
OF THE US GRAIN EMBARGO AGAINST THE USSR. (THIS CAME
LONO, APPRECIATIVE LAUGHTER FROM THE CHINESE.) HE
SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE MIDDLE EAST WAS THE
MOST DANGEROUS AREA IN THE WORLD AT PRESENT. HE WISHED

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TO SAY A WORD ABOUT WHAT WE WERE ACTUALLY DOING IN THE REGION, AS OPPOSED TO WHAT WE ARE PERCEIVED TO BE DOING.

43. OUR POLICY RESTS ON A RECOGNITION OF THE SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE AREA, INCLUDING RUSSIAN WILLINGNESS TO MOVE INTO THE HIGHLY UNSTABLE SITUATION IN IRAN, TO EXPLOIT THEIR ECOTMOID IN ADEN TO MOVE INTO NORTH YEMEN AND TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE SAUDIS AND OMAN FOR A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT. WE TOOK ACCOUNT OF THE NEW TREATY THEY HAD SIGNED WITH SYRIA, AND THE WAYS IN WHICH THEY EXPLOITED ARAB-ISRAELI DIFFERENCES. WE ADOPT ATTENTION TO THEIR SUPPORT FOR LIBYA, AND THEIR EFFORT TO ESTABLISH WHAT EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT TERMED "BELTS" OF CONTROL FROM NORTH AFRICA ACROSS THE MIDDLE EAST.

44. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HIS FIRST TRIP ABROAD HAD BEEN TO DEAL WITH THE CONTRADICTIONS WHICH HAD ARISEN. HE HAD TWO OBJECTIVES: (1) CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR AN OVERALL MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT; AND (2) STRENGTHEN ATTITUDES WITH RESPECT TO THE DANGERS FROM THE SOVIETS AMONG THE ARAB STATES.

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45. NEWSPAPER REPORTS NOTWITHSTANDING, WE HAVE MADE
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS. WE HAD ESTABLISHED A WHOLE NEW
SET OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH SAUDI ARABIA. 5030 281) 47719
IN SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF SAUDI AID TO PAKISTAN, SUDAN
AND ROMANIA, AS WELL AS SAUDI ASSISTANCE IN EFFORTS TO
COMBAT THE LIBYAN INVASION OF CHAD. WE HAD REVERSED THE
ISOLATED ATTITUDE OF JORDAN. WE HAD EVEN BEGUN A
TENTATIVE, EVOLUTIONARY IMPROVEMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIPS
WITH IRAQ. ALL THESE INITIATIVES AND STEPS HAD BEEN
SET BACK BY THE ISRAELI BATO ON THE TRAIT NUCLEAR FACIL-
ITIES. THE US HAD ISSUED AN UNPRECEDENTED CONDEMNATION OF
ISRAEL AND SUSPENDED THE SHIPMENT OF F-16'S TO IT.

46. OUR GREATEST DEGREE OF COORDINATION CONTINUES TO BE
WITH EGYPT. THE EGYPTIANS WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH
US

ON THE PEACE PROCESS. THEY WILL COOPERATE STRATEGICALLY,
PROVIDING ALL THE MILITARY FACILITIES WE NEED TO WORK
AGAINST THE SOVIETS AND DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF GHADAFI
AND HIS ACTIVITIES IN NORTH AFRICA.

47. WITH RESPECT TO NAMIBIA, THE PROBLEM WAS THAT WORKING
EXCLUSIVELY WITH UN RESOLUTION 435 WOULD ONLY RESULT IN
THE LONG-RUN IN DIRECT CONFLICT BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND
THE SO-CALLED "FRONT LINE" STATES. HERE WE TO CONTINUE

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THE PARISH ADMINISTRATION'S FAILED POLICY, WE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO CONFLICT BETWEEN BLACK AFRICANS AND SOUTHERN WHITE MINORITIES. THIS WOULD OFFER GREAT OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET INTERVENTIONISM.

48. US EFFORTS TO REESTABLISH CREDIBILITY IN PRETORIA ARE DESIGNED TO ELICIT FROM THE SOUTH AFRICANS THE FLEXIBILITY THEY MUST EXERCISE TO GAIN GENUINE INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA. WE ALSO INTEND IN THIS CONNECTION TO

ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CURAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA. WE WERE NOT MAKING NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE CONDITIONAL ON CURAN WITHDRAWAL, BUT WE WERE CONFIDENT THAT, IN THE FINAL STAGES, WE COULD BRING ABOUT SUCH WITHDRAWAL.

49. OUR BASIC APPROACH WAS CONSISTENT WITH RESOLUTION 435, BUT MORE COMPREHENSIVE, INCLUDING MINIMAL GUARANTEES FOR MINORITIES, GENUINE SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT, AND TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT FOR THE COUNTRY. THERE COULD BE NO PEACE WITHOUT SOUTH AFRICAN COOPERATION. ONLY THE US COULD OBTAIN SUCH COOPERATION. TO DO THIS IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE THE FEELING THAT THE US UNDERSTANDS THEIR CONCERNS AS WELL AS THOSE OF OTHERS.

50. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY HAD JUST LEFT ZIMBABWE. THERE WAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HE HAD MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH LEADERS THERE.

51. HUANG NOTED THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH TIME, ONLY 20 MINUTES BEFORE THE SECRETARY HAD TO RETURN TO HIS GUEST HOUSE AND CHANGE FOR DINNER.

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92. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WISHED TO SPEAK BRIEFLY ABOUT POLAND. THE SITUATION THERE WAS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF RUSSIAN INTERVENTION WAS NOW STRONGER THAN IN THE RECENT PAST. THE STRUGGLE HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN BETWEEN THE SOLIDARITY LABOR MOVEMENT AND THE POLISH PARTY. IT WAS NOW BETWEEN THE POLISH PARTY ITSELF AND THE RUSSIAN PARTY. THERE WOULD BE A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION IN THE WEEKS AHEAD UNTIL THE POLISH PARTY CONGRESS IN JULY. THE SECRETARY INVITED FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG TO COMMENT ON THE POLISH SITUATION.

93. HUANG SAID

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97. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE AGREED COMPLETELY ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED ATTENTION TO THE AFGHAN AND KAMPUCHEAN SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT WE DO IN FACT HAVE UNUSUAL UNITY WITHIN NATO ON THE POLISH SITUATION. NOTING HUANG'S COMMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NAMIBIA, HE SAID THAT HE WOULD REALLY LIKE TO HAVE ANOTHER DAY IN WHICH TO DISCUSS THOSE ISSUES BECAUSE IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE WERE SOME DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH. THE UNITED STATES NEEDED CHINESE HELP TO ENSURE A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THOSE QUESTIONS. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT THE FOLLOWING MEETING BE DEVOTED TO A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE AFGHAN AND KAMPUCHEAN SITUATIONS.

98. HUANG SAID THAT IT WOULD BE PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE TO CONTINUE WITH THE DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES ON JUNE 19 BEFORE PROCEEDING TO DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL MATTERS.

THE MEETING CONCLUDED AT 6:30 P.M.
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